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Presentation 
This contribution to the ongoing network evaluation process at JDRC is primarily based 
on the observation of one specific network, "Regional Development and Indigenous Minorities 
in Southeast Asia" (88-0124), hereafter called "RDIMSEA" network. Initially considered a very 
promising project by program officers, one that would usefully link together several regional 
Centres researching on indigenous minorities in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, the 
outcome, though, has been disappointing. As a network, long term results are less than tangible 
and the project has been terminated in a state of relative confusion. Organisational problems, lack 
of research and intervention principles shared by all components, difference in size and strength 
among components, disengagement by some leaders during the course of activities, all are 
plausible but, yet, incomplete explanations of the failure. Is the nature of each component to be 
questioned? How really representative of the local minorities were they? What type of minority 
were these? Is it rather their communication and their relationship with each other that was a 
source of dispute? Or has their relationship with the donor been a significant factor? The first 
task of this proposal, therefore, is to search and identify the weak points of the endeavour. 
To contribute to the ongoing evaluation process in the Centre and to be in a position to 
provide guidelines to donors and members of networks for the future, it is proposed to extract 




to other cases. Such an inductive methodology has evident limits, and the discussion will not try 
to encompass the full range of the problematic or draw positive conclusions. It will chiefly point 
to useful analogies. 
How could repeating this "failure" be avoided in the future? This leads to the task of 
investigating the potential for building new operational linkages between components of a 
network to be. The needs for networking among Southeast Asian research Centres working with 
indigenous minorities still exist and are still manifest while left largely unanswered. Is there a 
possibility for rebuilding an effective network within the same environment and with the same 
type of members and tasks without falling into the same traps? What are the potential members' 
requests for participating in a more promising project, and what could be the donors' 
requirements to finance them? In the second section, a sketch for a preliminary framework taking 
these questions into account will be drawn. 
A social anthropologist, the author favours an organic perspective. In terms of method, 
he went through the relevant IDRC files, interviewed program officers in Ottawa, talked with 
the network coordinator, and met with some of the participants in order to gather their analysis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the process they once participated in. Meetings were also held 
with new potential local participants in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam to investigate the possibility 
of creating a new network on indigenous minorities in the region, one that could take into 
account the conclusions and suggestions from the prior analysis as well as those from the 
evaluation process in general. 
The author is an external observer who came only lately in touch with the network under 
scrutiny here. He has not witnessed the network's activities in the field as they occurred and 
therefore, his inquiry is by no means to be considered exhaustive and will probably reflect its 
author's insufficiencies. His hope is that despite the flaws and the possibly missing information, 
the overall analysis will be basically correct and accurate. 
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I- EVALUATION-OF THE NETWORK 
I-i Project summary 
IDRC network "Regional Development and Indigenous Minorities in Southeast Asia" was 
initially funded for 24 months. Funding was officially approved on 20 October 1988, the project 
completion date was set for mid 1991 and the project termination date was mid 1992. There were 
at the outset an interest for eventually renew the funding for a second term. At the mid term 
workshop in February 1991, a new final completion date was set to 28 February 1992. In April 
1992, an extension without additional funding for the entire network was granted to allow each 
component the necessary time to prepare their respective reports for the final workshop scheduled 
for July 1992. New completion date was then set for 31 August 1992, and new termination date 
for 31 March 1993. Finally, the file in Ottawa, although incomplete and missing some of the 
financial and activities reports, was nonetheless officially closed on 12 December 1994. 
RDIMSEA was an externally mobilized network. It grouped 5 components among which 
two were of the NGO type (Chiang Mai and Sabah), one was a mixed NGO-academic team 
(Baguio), one was strictly academic (Bangkok), the coordinating office being also located within 
academic context at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the University of Malaya in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Project summary abstract by E.A.Pye, program officer in ASRO, reads as follows: 
"This project will study the impact of regional development programs on 
indigenous minorities in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Regional 
development is used in Southeast Asia to concentrate resources on depressed areas 
which have been left behind economically. Tribal minorities account for a large 
part of the population in these areas and the impact of these development 
programs on their economic livelihood and culture can be profound. Seven case 
studies will be undertaken to evaluate this impact and to study the response of 
these communities to this outside change." 
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The objective was to carry out cases studies on indigenous minorities which had been 
recipients of regional development programs in Thailand, continental and insular Malaysia, and 
the Philippines in order to evaluate their impacts. Questions to be asked for the research were: 
"To what extent have these programs improved the standard of living as against 
bringing greater impoverishment due to the loss of lands and resources? What 
have been the benefits of integration into a wider society and how has this 
integration affected tribal social structures and organizations? What responses have 
minorities made to these outside development programs? Have they acquiesced, 
engaged in hostile acts or shunned regional development through passive 
resistance?" (Project summary: ii) 
The network project had been commented upon by several members of IDRC personnel 
before approval and was generally praised. As stated in the Project summary, it directly fitted 
"the Centre's concern for poor rural populations who live outside of the mainstream of 
development, people who are at political, economic and social disadvantage". The participants 
were estimated to be "already experienced and sensitive to the issues under investigation", and 
"all participants [had] extensive research experience among tribal communities and the centres 
to which they [were] attached are tribal research institutes in many cases" (Project summary:v). 
Some researchers coming from some of the tribal minorities under study, there seemed to be a 
guarantee for successful grassroots research with foreseeable and tangible returns in the studied 
communities. The project had been labelled "important and innovative" by one senior program 
officer. 
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1-2 History of the network difficulties 
Circumstantial difficulties. 
A major source of confusion right at the beginning of the venture was the early change 
in key personnel. The two main initiators of the network did quit, they were -- perhaps hastily - 
- replaced by new actors who had no previous relationship to each other, and here probably lies 
a most important circumstantial factor for the subsequent problems. 
Most importantly, the initial leader of the project, A. Gomez, an anthropologist attached 
to the Kuala Lumpur Institute already cited, quit the group early on when offered a permanent 
position in an Australian University. He was replaced without consultation of the components 
or the donor by the coordinating institution by T.G. Lim, an economist who had participated in 
some of the early meetings of the group. On the donor side, the initial program officer, E. Pye, 
quit the Singapore office in the first months of the project to take a job at CIDA in Bangkok. 
No regional budget being affected to the project, another IDRC program officer, J. Voss, was 
asked to manage the project from Ottawa. What could have been a minor problem, i.e. the 
change in management personnel, got aggravated by the physical distance between the donor's 
representative, the coordination, and the participants. Management from Ottawa, despite the 
active and dedicated help from Singapore office staff, did not help to fix problems in SEA that 
were mostly minor ones but that, added to each other and mixed with other sources of 
antagonism, eventually amounted to serious difficulties. 
Could the venture have been able to work more smoothly and attain its objectives if the 
two initiators were not gone? In terms of cohesion and leadership of the network, the answer is 
probably yes. Coordination would have been assumed by the person who personally solicited 
most participants, and this person was sharing their disciplinary background, i.e. he was an 
anthropologist like most of them. On the donor's side, had the program officer been in Singapore 
instead of Ottawa, there would certainly have been more regular communication and contacts 
between the donor and the recipients, and tighter control of the schedule and outputs to be 
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produced in accordance to the initial agreement. But even this would probably not have erased 
the other sources of friction visible in this network. 
Structural difficulties 
In this case, it seems that the initial motivation for many participants was primarily their 
component's interest. Component leaders interviewed for this report have clearly expressed that 
their initial interest was to be able to conduct a research on "their" subject, "their" tribals. When 
specifically asked about their feeling in taking part in this network, none expressed any 
excitement about actively cooperating with other components in the form of a network. 
Otherwise, the importance of networking was simply not mentioned. When asked about their 
personal evaluation of the project's regults, their component's performance comes first, and they 
only get to talk about network performance when specifically asked about it. In this light, it 
becomes obvious that this network has definitely not been an internally grown initiative, that it 
has not met with strong enthusiasm on the part of the recipients. It seems rather that it was 
plainly an outside effort to connect components whose interests were only loosely related and 
whose leaders were only marginally interested in networking. The choice of these participants 
for the purpose of networking or, equally likely, the way they were presented the initiative and 
invited to join in, is therefore questionable. 
Some of the components already existed before the network was set afoot, while some 
others formed only to take part in the funding opportunity. This should have been an indicator 
of motivation of some of the participants. The nature of each component and the feasibility of 
their being linked in a common endeavour could have been discussed more thoroughly as it 
proved afterwards to be a major source of dissatisfaction on all sides. Most importantly, and not 
untypically, the fracture between "academics" and "activists" proved to be a durable and 
pernicious one. During interviews as well as in their correspondence with the donor, the formers 
steadily accused the latters of putting political priorities at the top of their agenda and being 
emotionally engaged in their research to the point of threatening the scientific validity of their 
findings, while the latters accused the farmers of looking first at promoting their own career 
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interests and not care for the tribals they were "only" studying. A good deal of literature exist 
on the difficulties of linking academics with grassroots actors in such endeavours, it is not 
necessary here to go one more time through those arguments. 
There was also the international nature of the project. What are the chances for a network 
including components from different countries to be able to operate smoothly, to work together 
efficiently enough to develop a group cohesion that can take roots and attain its objectives, first 
thanks to the funds received and maybe afterwards even produce a viable body that could evolve 
independently from the initial help from the donor? This certainly is a major challenge for this 
sort of venture. In the case of the RDIMSEA network, linguistic, cultural, religious, political 
and economic differences did not only exist between the researchers -- mostly lowlanders if not 
foreigners -- and their object -- highland minorities --, but there was also an important cultural 
gap between the members themselves. These were each used to and constrained by their national 
academic context. They operated within different policy frameworks. They each were bounded 
by national research agendas. Some came from megalopolis such as Bangkok, some were based 
in small towns in Sabah or Luzon. On top of the early antagonism between academic and NGO 
worlds, we are led to suspect that there was also an urban/rural cleavage (Bangkok vs Chiang 
Mai or Baguio), a centre/periphery one (Kuala Lumpur vs Sabah), a local/outsider one 
(highianders vs lowlanders), an Asian/Western one (Thai vs farang), a rich/poor one (University 
professors vs NGO workers, or Malaysia vs Philippines), a Buddhist/Muslim/Christian one 
(Thailand vs Malaysia vs Philippines), and so on. In this case, it could almost be said that the 
populations under study had definitely more in common, despite their ethnic and historical 
particularities, than the people funded to study them. 
This observation leads us to think that there may have been a confusion, in the mind of 
the architects responsible for this network, in wrongly assuming that organizations studying 
similar people are also significantly similar between themselves. That they move on grounds and 
assumptions common to the point that they can be presumed to have enough in common to be 
able to share research priorities, ideologies and methods, and work together smoothly. 
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On the other tand, it can not be easily sustained that keeping the recruitment of network 
participants within specific cultural, political or national boundaries would prove to be more 
fruitful. It would certainly increase the objective working cohesion of the body (language, 
political framework, research agendas,, values) but it could not erase ideological, economical or 
status dissimilarities. Group work, indeed, implies working with the other, and to reduce to a 
minimum the gap between participants, a sheer effort must be done to decrease the causes of 
conflicts between participants, even more so if they are highly different in several ways like they 
were in this case. 
Within this framework, it can be understood that the wider the gap between participants, 
the more difficult will be the building of group cohesiveness, and the more likely will opposition 
and antagonisms pop out. The consequent conclusion is that a working body with a large gap 
must be carefully coordinated in terms of respect of time frame to avoid drifting, chiefly for 
components less tightly linked to the core of the network. But it must also be coordinated loosely 
in terms of the respect of speciflcities among individuals and local organisations that have 
different organisational cultures and research ideologies. The coordination must be utterly aware 
of the possible sources of friction between highly different participants and must be prepared to 
face it quickly, if not to foresee and diffuse them even before they can appear. 
1-3 The problem with governance 
No indication could be found that the definition of the specific role of the coordinator of 
the network has been a priority at the outset, not even a task among others. It seems to have 
been basically left to the person getting the job and to the institution to which that person 
belonged to define it. On the donor's side, no traces exist of an effort to make this governance 
different than what it eventually turned out to be: distant, top-down and institutionally oriented. 
To the credit of the coordinator, it must be said that part of the blame for this flaw should 
probably be put on the donor's representatives for failing to raise and address this crucial 
question at the outset, a task they could be expected to include in their routine procedure. 
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Some IDRC personnel and network participants have clearly stated that not only was the 
network leadership not satisfactory but that it has also been in itself an important source of 
problems. Coming from a different disciplinary background (economics) than most of his 
partners (social anthropology), the coordinator appointed in replacement of the initial one did not 
share, and maybe even ignored, the participants disciplinary culture and priorities. From the 
evidence consulted for this evaluation, he seems not to have included in his duties the ones 
directed at strengthening the network's internal cohesion, and did little to smoothen 
communication between coordination and components, coordination and the donor, as well as• 
between components. 
The coordinator being also part of one of the network components, he has been depicted 
by members of other components as being accordingly biased. He provoked some negative 
reactions with other components by imperatively asking for data to be collected and sent to Kuala 
Lumpur in order to draw an atlas of ethnic minorities. Although not initially included in the 
project's outcomes to be, the possibility of working on an atlas of Southeast Asian ethnic 
minorities had been discussed a few times between participants. However, it had not been agreed 
upon during the network's life. The coordinator appears to have made such a demand without 
appropriate discussion being held and necessary procedures being agreed upon by the participants 
and the donor's representatives. 
Conflicts between the coordination and components also arose because of unpredictable 
factors. When asked by a European agency funding the Chiang Mai component for years, and 
at the suggestion of the latter's director who put his confidence in his colleague, the network 
coordinator participated in the production of a critical evaluation of the recipient's performance. 
As a consequence, the donors refrained from renewing their funding and that component had to 
ask the program officer in charge in Ottawa to provide for the loss in order to simply perform 
the normal duties within the network's agenda. The relationship between the network coordinator 
and the leader of the Chiang Mai component never recovered from this blow. Nor did actually 
the one with Ottawa and Singapore staff who judged severely the diplomatic misbehaviour of the 
coordinator. Moreover, the coordinator did not seem to be aware or maybe chose to ignore 
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that frictions were growing between him and the donor's representatives. The files show that 
from 1991 on, he made a number of demands for extra funding without appropriate justification, 
and that most were rejected with internal comments that indicate serious dissatisfaction and 
growing suspicion about him. An Ottawa officer declared to this author that from that time on, 
he did no more believe in the viability of this venture and decided to let go the project to an end 
and merely help the really working components to complete their job. 
The coordinator himself, when interviewed, has however a different story to tell. He 
declares he has been appointed coordinator in replacement of the initial one -- one he labels a 
junior colleague - plainly because he was actually the most valid candidate at that time. He 
acknowledges the diplomatic error regarding the Chiang Mai component but puts the essential 
of the blame on the component's director, who had apparently agreed with the evaluation report 
only to reject it afterwards. He acknowledges as well that he did not sufficiently keep in touch 
with each component, but only because the donor's representatives wouldn't allow him additional 
money to make the many necessary field trips. He deplores that the network money was sent 
directly to each component, depriving him from the possibility to manage it centrally. The 
coordinator acknowledges as well that his relationship with the donor was not good but he puts 
the blame on what he calls a lack of transparency of the Centre and an authoritative behaviour 
from the IDRC representatives. He is critical of the ASRO representatives for their bureaucratic 
attitude towards money, and he points at the Ottawa one for doing parts of the coordinating job 
he himself should have been left to do alone. This competition with Ottawa was obviously 
important, to the point that after the Chiang Mai component's evaluation episode, the 
coordinator estimates that the program officer actually had taken back all the normal duties 
associated with the governance of the network and dealt thereafter with each component 
individually. He believes that the program officer is responsible for not having taken the 
necessary steps to solve these problems with him rather than act authoritatively and marginalise 
him. 
There are visibly, valid arguments on all sides in this imbroglio and a good deal of the 
misunderstandings seems to be actually linked to the strong personalities facing each other. It is 
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however likely that most of the problems that popped out in relation with the network governance 
could have been better dealt with if the choice of the new coordinator had been discussed with 
the coordinating Institute and if his role had been better defined and clearly agreed upon at an 
early stage of the network's life. The initiative of performing this task normally goes to the 
donor or, at least, should be promoted by his representatives. In the absence of this early 
impulsion -- for reasons I couldn't identify --, the door was left wide open for a progressive 
sliding and the ultimate degradation that occurred afterwards. 
1-4 Network outputs 
The project proposal stated several outputs that were to come out from the network's 
activities. First, the coordinating institution in Kuala Lumpur was to produce a synthesis report 
with data from individual case studies; no real effort appears to have been made to materialize 
this task. Second, seven case studies were to be carried out, one in the Philippines, four in 
Malaysia, and two in Thailand. As a result, and one peninsular Malaysia case having been 
abandoned rapidly, six were actually being conducted at the moment of the mid term meeting 
in February 1991. Afterwards, if the writing of final technical reports can be an indicator of the 
work that has really been done, the situation is as follows. By October 1993, the Bangkok and 
Baguio components had given final technical and financial reports and their files were 
accordingly closed. A deadline was fixed to 15 December 1993 for the other components to 
submit their final reports. By 9 December 1993, a final technical report -- but no fmancial report 
-- was sent by the coordinator in Kuala Lumpur for the whole of the Malaysian participants, 
although several never wrote theirs. Ultimately, all remaining files were closed on 12 December 
1994 without further reports being received. The third planned output was a research bulletin that 
was to be published four times a year. Eleven issues were effectively released between July 1989 
and September 1992. Fourth planned output was the publishing of a comprehensive bibliography 
on regional development and indigenous minorities in ASEAN countries. As a single and 
complete publication, this did not materialize. Fifth output to be was the improvement in the 
research and information base for studies on tribal affairs in the region. This output being 
difficult to measure, it can however be assumed that the components having completed their work 
12 
have, as such, contributed to this task. Sixth, a data centre for the collection, the processing and 
the dissemination of information on regional development and indigenous minorities was to be 
established at the coordinating institution in Kuala Lumpur. It does not seem that a specific 
outcome can be associated with this task, although that institution has without any doubt collected 
and, to a certain extend, processed data gathered during the network existence. Seventh and last, 
national dissemination workshops were to be held for key government agencies and NGOs. To 
our knowledge, based on the files, all that has been done in this line by network researchers was 
to participate in a Common property resource Workshop held in Winnipeg from 30 Sept. to 2 
Oct. 1991. The network's mid term and final workshops, held respectively in Chiang Mai 
(February 1991) and Kota Kinabalu (9-12 July 1992), can also be assumed to have at least partly 
served this task, although most participants were regulars in the network's activities. In a broader 
perspective, the network's contribution into the academic circles was tangible with several 
members presenting papers at local, regional and international conferences, and some of these 
were later published in academic Journals. Since many among these papers were initially written 
as components' reports to be presented at one of the two workshops, their existence clearly owes 
to the network. 
The network's concrete contribution to the indigenous minorities that were under study 
has been minimal. The academic components can not decently pretend having had a direct impact 
on the populations they studied, and their possible contribution to government officials or to 
lawmakers in the form of recommendations has yet to be made. As is normally the case, the 
NGO components had a more tangible impact in the way that they were able, thanks to the funds 
received for the network, to go on with their grassroots activities and their ideologically oriented 
research agendas. Some village meetings were held and the information gathered was shared as 
much as was possible. 
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I-S A few lessons from this experience 
One IDRC program officer stated that in this case, the supporters of the initial proposal 
• . .just did not have a good enough idea of which groups are doing really good work with 
indigenous minorities in the region". That person, it seems to us, had a point. 
Defining what "good work" is may be a tricky task. But finding who is regularly and in 
priority doing work with and about indigenous minorities is easy to assess. In this case, the NGO 
type components did, and the highly institutionalized ones did not really. This became obvious 
during the network lifetime, but we are convinced that it was also detectable at the early stages 
of the project. Tighter selection criteria for participants to the network could have led. to a more 
homogeneous team composition, and here, homogeneity not only refers to a higher degree of 
similarity between the components, their nature and their methodologies. It also means a more 
intimately linked set of working ideologies and a more complete understanding of each other's 
particularities and specific tasks. Doing this legwork at an early stage of team work is a 
demanding job, it must be skilfully conducted, but the reward in the future life of the team is 
likely to be worth it. To succeed, this burden is to be shared between the network initiators, be 
they from the donor organisation or from the recipients' ones or, ideally, from both. 
Mixing together NGOs and academic institutions into the same network requires a good 
deal of swiftness, genuine mutual understanding of basic similarities and differences between 
components, and should require discussion between participants (ideally in the donor's presence) 
to establish clearly what are the objectives, the capacities and the means of each of them. It could 
prove to be profitable to make disciplinary background of participants, shared initial assumptions 
and methods, discussion on objectives and on leadership inseparable parts of the setting afoot of 
a network. 
NGO type organisations have a tendency it often even is a necessity to manage 
several funds and project at once in order to simply survive and be capable of doing the 
essentials of their task. Such almost inevitable spreading of energy between several priorities and 
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even perhaps between several networks, poses the question of the capacity for these less 
permanent structures to select priorities in accordance to the needs of one particular network. If 
networking is to reduce workload among participants instead of increasing it as it should be 
expected to do on the long run, it may be so only after a certain time of work during which the 
participants have been investing in it. Fragile organizations may not have the necessary "energy 
capital" to be able to wait for hypothetical results. If they try to, they are likely put their life on 
the line. The Chiang Mai component in the RDIMSEA network was a typical example of this. 
On the other hand, highly institutionalized components like universities and the 
participants they provided for networking as described above, are highly bureaucratic and are 
normally in no need of the donor's money to survive and perform their normal duties. Such 
participants naturally tend to be less implicated with their object of research, they are less 
dedicated and, often, they pursue a personal research and career agenda. Prejudices are common 
when academics look at NGO workers, and the other way around too. This might be inevitable 
at the outset and should be dealt with accordingly. 
Governance always turns out to be a key issue in any project, even more so in networks 
where participants in different locations do not share the daily agenda and activities that help 
forge a sense of belonging as it does, for example, inside one component. In the RDIMSEA 
network case, it has been singled out indifferent terms and maimers by several actors, including 
the coordinator himself, to be the main reason for the collapse of the project. To a certain 
extend, this can be taken as true. The coordinator's identity, attitude and behaviour, the role of 
the IDRC representatives, the mutual expectations between the coordinator and these 
representatives, as well as the delicate relationship between each component and, on one side, 
the coordinator and, on the other, the donor's representatives, could be more thoroughly 
investigated to get a realistic and useful picture of the set of problems that contributed to make 
this network a disappointing experience for all participants. 
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II- WHAT POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR A NETWORK ON INDIGENOUS 
MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA? 
IDRC's new Asia Strategy and Program as presented in the first draft of 30 June 1994 
and update of 19 January 1995, states: 
"The fundamental premises of the Asia Program remain those of empowerment 
through knowledge, support for development research and capacity-building, 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development." (Draft 2, p.17) 
It is clear that several members of the RDIMSEA network on indigenous minorities as well as 
a number of potential new components in a possible new network on the same subject do share 
these objectives. At this moment, several of the Centre's key issues and objectives in its Asia 
Program are being addressed in a number of ongoing projects. 
However, since the RDIMSEA network was conceived in 1988, considerable economic 
development took place in Malaysia and Thailand in particular and, to a lesser degree, in the 
Philippines. Some of the major Centre's objectives regarding its Southeast Asian partners are 
nowadays well on their way to be achieved in these three countries, although it is disputable to 
assess that this recent national wealth reaches highland indigenous minorities to the same extend 
than lowlanders from the national majorities. 
In the light of these recent developments, the Centre is accordingly moving its national 
focus in Southeast Asia from these newly developed countries to other ones where its help is 
more urgently needed. It is not likely then that Thailand and Malaysia in particular, in their 
actual stage of economic and social development, would still be acceptable in the list of direct 
recipients for a possible future network on indigenous minorities in the region. 
On the other hand, in a new venture that would eventually involve countries of the 
Southeast Asian massif where highland minorities still exist (see below), Thailand could play a 
useful although indirect role. Thailand has developed a sound expertise about its highland 
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minorities during the. last 30 years. Being for decades the only politically stable and conflict free 
country in the Southeast massif region, being also considerably helped by the United States as 
a key ally during the Second Indochina War (1964-75), it had the necessary time and energy to 
get to know its own indigenous minorities, and a large number of foreign researchers have 
contributed to a body of scholarly literature that exceeds by far that of any neighbouring country 
on this subject. In this light, Thailand could very well take a role in indirect participation and 
as a support base for research and exchange between participants of an overall network working 
with highland minorities in the region. 
What is the utility of networking as a specific form of action on indigenous minorities in 
Southeast Asia? If the basic assumption pleading for the creation by donors of externally driven 
networks as stated in "Discussion paper on networks: A point of departure" (Jan.94) are still 
considered valid i.e. economy of scale and impact on large numbers, facilitative transfer of 
knowledge and technology from advanced to less advanced, and institutional surrogates then 
there is definitely a point considering the possibility of a new network of bodies concerned with 
indigenous minorities in Southeast Asia. A new network that could put to use the lessons learned 
from recent experience and be more fit to avoid the pitfalls of the preceding one. 
In order to keep at a minimum the replacement of factors that could structure that possible 
new venture, and to allow the Centre to be able to operate an action in a reasonably near future, 
we will not challenge here the very structure of IDRC networking strategy. The following 
propositions play by the actual rules and present a variation on a known theme rather than a 
speculative initiative. 
The needs initially identified in the "Regional development and indigenous minorities in 
Southeast Asia" network project proposal, the objectives and most of the desired outcomes 
included to the 1988 proposal, were valid ones at that time and, by most researchers' opinion 
concerned with these questions, still are. In the task of looking for objectives, it is then not 
necessary to re-do what had been correctly done. On the other hand, more can certainly be said 
concerning the choice of populations under study. 
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The RDIMSEA network had linked indigenous populations in quite a variety of regions 
and cultural areas under the assumption that they belonged to an entity called "Southeast Asia". 
But Southeast Asia as a regional political body has only a very short existence, i.e. less than 30 
years. As far as historic, ethno-linguistic and anthropological classification are concerned, linking 
bighianders in Sabah, from ancient proto- and deutero-malay origin, with highianders in Northern 
Thailand, of very recent arrival, and this in two very different ecoregions -- to say nothing of 
the Philippines --, was a choice bounded to cope with as many differences than similarities. As 
an indicator of this variety is the fact that the final activities reports that have been produced for 
that network hardly link to each other, and if the ethnic variety in the population basin chosen 
can not be labelled the only reason for that, it certainly must be pointed a major one. 
Focusing more tightly on one ecoregion and a closer cultural identity can definitely be 
of some help. It can be found in the continental Southeast Asian massif. Politically divided 
between six countries (southern China, eastern India, the northern parts of Burma, Thailand, 
Laos and Vietnam), it represents a basin of nationally marginal but nonetheless culturally related 
populations practising very similar economic activities highly determined by a shared ecosystem. 
Almost each of these groups straddles across national boundaries and has close relatives in one 
or several of the neighbouring national entities. The Hmong (or Meo, Miao), for instance, are 
to be found in notable numbers in five of these countries (except India), totalling more than 5 
million individuals. 
Most importantly from the perspective of establishing a horizontally linked network aimed 
at studying the impact of development programs on indigenous minorities, these groups also 
share a similarly problematic relationship with their respective states, a diffiàult cohabitation 
rooted in cultural and religious differences, historic defiance, periods of violent opposition to 
lowland rule, and more recently authoritarian policies of sedentarization and forced inclusion into 
the market economy. They all inhabit geo-strategic areas along international borders that are not 
always peaceful. They all traditionally dwell on highlands that have recently become highly 
sensitive parts of national watersheds that are said by central powers to be in urgent need of 
protection at all costs. 
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There is no point for IDRC to attempt tackling this complex situation as a whole. A more 
tightly focused action should be envisaged and, incidently, a favourable conjuncture does exiSt. 
At this moment, IDRC has five ongoing projects involving highland minorities in four of those 
six countries (see Appendice 1). This conjuncture is extremely favourable for the possibly rapid 
establishment of a coordinating body between these ongoing projects if needed and the 
respective recipient/research institutions, this for three reasons. 
The first is that there is an obvious horizontal linkage possibility between these projects, 
as much in terms of connection between the issues being addressed as well as on the grounds of 
their total or partial disciplinary focuses, i.e. social sciences. The second is that, based on the 
evaluation of the former network performance, linking existing components sounds more 
promising than creating some or all of them for the sake of networking. Every local partners 
actually involved in those individual projects are therefore already IDRC partner, they have 
already been evaluated with a sufficiently high mark to be part of an IDRC funded project. This 
should be a indicator of potential compatibility with the purpose of networking. Thirdly, already 
existing components possess a working structure strong enough to be able to internally provide 
replacement for a key participant that could have to leave during the endeavour, one of the major 
problems encountered by the RDIMSEA network. 
A majority of these local partners are actually from the academic world, and NGO type 
partners are almost totally absent. There are two ways of coping with this perhaps undesirable 
specialization. Either IDRC seeks supplementary partners from the NGO sphere, or it makes 
the future network an academic one. The second option might better be avoided as it is 
not normally in the Centre's habits to support purely academic works, and the pitfalls of such 
high flying level of research are well known. A more balanced composition might then request 
to recruit new or secondary NGO type partners on location, or graft on this nucleus of 5 partners 
one or two more action-oriented ongoing IDRC projects. Actually, IDRC has another clearly 
related and quite well balanced ongoing project in the Southeast Asia region, one that involves 
indigenous minorities in the Cordillera of northern Luzon, the Philippines (91-0074 Indigenous 
Practices and State Policy in the Sustainable Management of Agricultural Lands and Forests in 
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the Cordillera). In its earlier form, that project was part of the RDIMSEA network and kept a 
very good record of academic as well as participatory research. It could most probably fit 
smoothly with the new venture. Its few differences with the IDRC projects in the Southeast Asia 
massif -- chiefly about different ethnic identities and ecosystem -- as compared with the 
similarities -- highland-lowland dichotomy, ethnic minority different from the national identity, 
difficult relationship with the State -- should not outweighs the advantages of having it grafted 
to the main nucleus. 
In term of governance for this new network, lessons from the RDIMSEA network suggest 
a few tracks that might be safer to follow. At the earliest stages of discussion, all potential 
participants should have an opportunity to meet and express clearly their motivations and 
expectations. IDRC representatives should take the initiative to thoroughly discuss with every 
component all issues related to the coordination of the project. The largest possible consensus 
should be sought in key matters as the identity of the coordinator, his mode of selection and 
demotion (i.e. democratic vs authoritative mode), the duration of his mandate, the extend as well 
as the limits of his powers, and his institutional affiliation. In particular, discussion over the 
identity of the network leader might include such things as his/her disciplinary background, 
outspoken dedication to the research topic, capacities as a mediator and a communicator, and 
capacity as an administrator. Originality should be encouraged and, for example, the possibility 
of a bi-cephalus coordination or a rotation of coordinator from each of the different components 
could be discussed. The specific duties of the coordinator and those of the donor's representatives 
should be detailed and agreed upon. The extend of every actor's control over the budget should 
be clearly stated. The expectations towards desirable outputs of the network should be put clearly 
on the table and agreed upon, and academic components and NGOs could be allowed to have 
different tasks as they operate in different traditions with different values and methodologies (i.e. 
programme planning by objectives). The tasks, the methods and the rights and duties of each 
component should be stated as clearly as possible. Do these components and these people want 
to network together? What are their motivations to do so? According to them, what would be the 
role of the network regarding the work already being done in each location? What are the issues 
that would gain to be addressed collectively? What are the private zones in each situation whose 
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boundaries the network should not be allowed to trespass? What should be the lifespan of the 
network? An early group discussion could contribute to prevent misunderstandings about each 
other's tasks and responsibilities further down the road. 
Concerning the coordinating institution in particular, it could be decided that it should not 
be one of the direct participants to one of the specific projects linked to the network, this in 
order to avoid national biases or that local research agendas can interfere with the network's own 
one. In line with this suggestion, a possible partner just appeared in the region that might deserve 
to be paid attention and may be of some value for a future network on indigenous minorities. A 
project for the creation of a Centre for Ethnic Studies and Development, to be attached to the 
University of Chiang Mai in Thailand, has recently been accepted for funding by the Ford 
Foundation. The proposal was prepared jointly by the Social Research Institute and the 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, both at the University of Chiang Mai. The Centre's 
raison d'etre is to be used as a research and training institute for ethnic studies and development 
in mainland Southeast Asia. Its first objective is to 
"Promote policy-oriented academic research on ethnicity and ethnic relations in 
north mainland Southeast Asia: northern Thailand, northern Burma, Laos, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and southern China." 
Its range of activities includes academic research as well as NGO workers training sessions, 
regional researcher's workshops, and hilitribe language courses. As stated before, Thailand has 
developed an expertise on highland minorities that its neighbour could profitably tap, and the 
creation of this Centre could very well serve this task. 
Another key issue has to be clearly addressed and properly answered. It is the place to 
assign to participants involved in the conducting of the research process and belonging themselves 
to the minorities under study. This is a sensitive issue. As convinced as we might be of the 
necessity that grassroots representatives should participate in the research process, by no means 
can it be stated that indigenous researchers are automatically better than non-indigenous ones. 
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This would be a naive position that would ignore the internal antagonisms and conflicts inherent 
to every local community. How to chose such a person? On what criteria? The more literate they 
would be and the more able to participate in conceptual work on their own group, the more 
likely they will be somewhat alienated from their peers as most of them are still either nomadic, 
lineage based, or pre-literate peasant societies. Electing individual partners from acephalus 
societies is a tricky exercise. A compromise position should be sought out, one where educated 
participants could be considered as enlightened readers of their own cultural contexts, as opposed 
to outside observers, rather than representatives for the group they belong to. In terms of 
collectivity, the possible participation of minorities to the network is an easier issue to tackle. 
Holding village meetings, returning the information to the participants and seeking their opinion 
on policy recommendations is feasible, and it is actually being done in most of the ongoing 
projects that could be linked to this network. The Philippines project, for instance, has developed 
to a great extend its capacity to integrate villagers in the research process and to return to them 
with consultation meetings. 
Another factor to keep in mind in discussing the possibility of networking between the 
above mentioned components is the different political ideologies they belong to. Laos and 
Vietnam and, in a different way, China are still quite conservative Socialist regimes and operate 
on different premises than frankly Capitalist neighbours like, say, Thailand or the Philippines. 
India is still a strong believer in the virtues of non-alignment. These specificities have concrete 
impacts like, in the Socialist countries, the non-existence of local NGOs or the impossibility for 
the donor to simply pick up the local partner he prefers. In these circumstances, the selection of 
the coordinator and his institution could be a sensitive issue and would require from the chosen 
leader additional communication and negotiation skills. 
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APPENDICE I 
Ongoing IDRC projects in the continental Southeast Asia massif. 
INDIA 94-8308 Sustainable land use options for shifting cultivation 
(Nagaland) 
A four year project that begun in 1994-5 aimed at enabling local researchers to work with 
village communities and helping traditional swiddeners to strengthen village-level 
institutions in the management of natural resources. 
Recipient institution: Office of the Agricultural Production Commissioner (Nagaland). 
Research institution: State Agriculture Research Station (Yisemyong, Nagaland) 
CHINA 94-8011 Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development in 
Xishuangbanna Biosphere Reserve (Yunnan) 
A three year project that begun in 1994 aiming at developing innovations in the 
management of biodiversity by focusing on the coiiflicts with livelihoods of minority 
ethnic groups. 
Recipient institution: Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere (MAB) 
Programme, Beijing. Research institutions: 1) Institute of Ecology and Geobotany, 
Yunnan University; 2) Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve. 
VIETNAM-I 92-003 Biodiversity and Sustainable Development of Swidden Agriculture 
in Northern Vietnwn 
A three year project that begun in 1993 aiming at contributing to the stabilization of 
swidden agriculture in Vietnam through development of viable agriculture and socio- 
economic plans that facilitate more efficient and economic land-use. Recipient institution: 
Centre for Natural Resources Management and Environmental Studies, Hanoi. 
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VIETNAM-Il 934006 Le défi forestier au Vietnam / The Challenge of the forest in 
Vietnam 
A two year training/research project begun in 1994 and using a collaborative research 
project as a vehicule for training. Its research focus is the sustainable and equitable use 
of the country's forest resources and its central objective is to analyze the complex of 
underlying causes of deforestation so that policy and technological options can be 
developed. 
Recipient institution: Université Laval, Québec. Research institutions: 1) Université 
d'agriculture et de foresterie, Ho Clii Minh City; 2) Centre for Resource Management 
and Environmental Studies, Hanoi. 
LAOS 91-0095 Resource Management in Nam Ngum Watershed 
A one year project that has begun in 1992 and went through several reconduction since. 
It studies the livelihoods and resource management practices of upland agricultural 
villages, with a focus on local resource utilization conflicts in two adjacent, but ethnically 
distinct resettled villages. Another objective is to develop the research capacity of Lao 
government officials. 
Recipient institution: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Lao P.D.R. Research 
institution: Environmental Protection Office, Department of Forestry and Environment, 
Ministry of A&F. 
